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resident Yanukovich may be back to work after sick leave, but that is not going to 
help. Quite apart from his corrupt and undemocratic leadership, his work has 
demonstrated total professional incompetence from the beginning to what may now 
be his end. His presidency began by agreeing a 25-year extension for Russia’s lease on the 
Sevastopol naval base in exchange for a supposed gas price discount, which left Ukraine 
soon after paying even more than Germany. He has brought the Ukrainian economy to the 
brink of bankruptcy, and two weeks ago he passed into law sweeping repressive measures 
against the EuroMaidan, which so infuriated the people that he had to repeal them a week 
later. He cannot carry on like this. 
Regardless of when or how he quits office, his legacy will present huge and urgent problems 
for his successors, who under a first hypothesis would consist of some configuration of the 
present opposition leadership. The new government will be immediately confronted with 
the consequences of the financial and economic deals done by Yanukovich with Putin. 
Ukraine owes a lot of money to both Gazprom and the Russian state, and the current gas-
price discount of one-third and continued Russian funding are vulnerable to being 
discontinued at Moscow’s discretion. A chaotic financial, political and diplomatic scenario 
looms on the not-so-distant horizon, which in today’s revolutionary climate could lead to all 
manner of disasters, not excluding (as ex-President Kravchuk has just told the Rada) the 
disintegration of the Ukrainian state itself. 
The EU, elected by the Ukrainian street as honorary sponsor of the EuroMaidan, has to 
prepare for this contingency. Emergency situations require emergency measures, which the 
EU institutions and member states are advised to formulate now. The measures should be 
strong, immediate and comprehensible to Ukrainian citizens, and based on the steps 
outlined below. 
First the EU should help the Ukrainian economy offset the new punitive Russian trade 
sanctions, which could well be intensified, with an immediate interim implementation of key 
elements in the not-yet-signed Association Agreement (incorporating the Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement). The latter would notably consist of the suppression 
of EU import duties on Ukrainian products on day 1, whereas Ukrainian duties would only 
be gradually phased out. This would give an immediate stimulus for Ukrainian industries to 
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make a new push to export to European markets. The new Ukrainian leaders would sign the 
Association Agreement without delay, since it is already provided there that the tariff 
measures are among the ‘interim agreement’ measures that do not have wait for ratification. 
There would be also an understanding that the two parties would negotiate over those 
provisions in the Agreement that most worry the Ukrainian side with a view to working out 
remedial or compensatory implementation measures where justified.   
Second, the EU should signal to the IMF its willingness to increase its co-financing for a bail-
out operation to the extent of 50%, rather than the token sum of some $600 million offered so 
far; or to contribute comparable sums to an international coalition including the US (which 
press reports now say is under consideration). This will necessarily at some stage link to the 
question of repayment of debts to Russia. This problem could be addressed by a combination 
of rescheduling Russia’s short-term loans to Ukraine, irresponsibility granted without 
macroeconomic conditions, and recuperating funds embezzled by the Yanukovich regime 
(estimated by Anders Åslund to have amounted to $8 to 10 billion per year1). Screening for 
assets of Yanukovich and his ‘family’ in Western financial institutions should be coordinated 
between the EU, US, Switzerland and cooperative offshore financial centres, if they have not 
already begun this process.  
Serious efforts at visa facilitation would also be greatly appreciated in Ukraine, for example 
by making multi-year, multi-entry visas easily available to all Ukrainian nationals who have 
already been granted short-term visas without breaking the rules by overstaying (the 
member states can do this on their own initiative, since multi-year visas are not part of EU or 
Schengen competence).   
Finally the EU should signal to Russia its interest in pursuing without further delay the 
proposition of free trade with the customs union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, to 
which Putin expressed openness at the EU-Russia summit in Brussels on January 28th. This 
would be accompanied by the understanding that Ukraine would be free to enter into an 
excellent free trade agreement with the EU and as well as the Russia-led customs union. The 
legal/technical problems due to Belarus and Kazakhstan not yet being members of the WTO 
can be sorted out in due course, since the negotiations would take, in any case, considerable 
time. Nevertheless, the start of these negotiations would be a strategically important political 
opening towards Russia, picking up on Putin’s slogan of ‘Lisbon to Vladivostok’. Perhaps 
the Kremlin is becoming sufficiently worried about Ukraine spinning out of control that it 
would welcome a move from confrontation to cooperation in its relations with the EU over 
their common neighbourhood. 
These steps are of an order that could help the new leadership in Kyiv both survive its 
tumultuous first weeks and prepare for sound governance, with a crucial contribution to 
come from the Association Agreement with the EU.  
There are many alternative political scenarios implicit in the speculations swirling among 
Ukraine’s distressed and bewildered population. Our first hypothesis offered a scenario of 
hope. The alternatives include scenarios of disaster of huge proportions and unpredictable 
consequences for Ukraine and the strategic stability and security of all of Europe. Various 
factions within Yanukovich’s Party of the Regions are showing unhappiness with their 
leader. Some in Kharkhiv advocate greater use of force, which would head further down the 
road towards a dreaded civil war. Others talk of adding federalisation to the menu for 
constitutional reform, which could slide into separatism. Radicalisation could deepen on 
                                                   
1 Anders Åslund, “Payback time for the Yanukovich ‘family’”, Petersen International Institute for 
Economics, Washington, D.C., 13 December 2013. 
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both sides, from the Right Sector and neo-fascist elements concentrated in the West against 
militant pro-Russians concentrated in the East.  
Preparing mentally for the worst, a second hypothesis combining such elements could lead to 
what might be called the ‘Transnistrialisation’ of Ukraine, involving a separatist movement 
in Eastern and Southern Ukraine, including Crimea, which would mean de facto a break-
away from being governed by Kyiv. This scenario may be what ex-President Kravchuk had 
in mind in talking about a break-up of the state. It is difficult at this time to envisage with 
any precision how this would develop, with the possibilities ranging from sporadic, minor 
violence to a full-blown civil war, with or without establishment of border controls, etc. 
Maybe in a first stage there would be a creeping disintegration of the state with disobedience 
of regional leaders, just as there is already occupation by opposition movements of many 
regional administrative infrastructures in the West.  
The critical factor then would be the response of Russia, which has presumably already 
given up on Yanukovich being able to resume effective control. He would thus go in any 
case at some point. The crucial question for the Kremlin would be whether they prefer to see 
the emergence of ‘Transnistrialisation’ more than a single democratic Ukrainian state. The 
former model of Russian foreign policy has already been on display throughout the last two 
decades in the relatively small examples of Georgia and Moldova. But the case of Ukraine is 
at least ten times more important. It has also the special Crimea and Sevastopol factors: the 
Russian naval presence in Sevastopol, and the association in the Russian mind-set of Crimea 
as the part of historical Russia that Khrushchev stupidly gave away to Ukraine a few decades 
ago, but where the current simmering tensions between Russians and Tartars could easily 
ignite into local conflict. And then if the Odessa region to the South were part of the 
separatist bloc, there would be territorial contiguity with the original Transnistria, and so on 
to a change of government in Chisinau, which would also withdraw from the Association 
Agreement with the EU. What a triumph!  
But would it be so? What if such developments led to real civil war? Where would the 
political dynamics lead, for Ukraine, Europe, Russia, and especially for Russia’s place in the 
world, with the ‘law of unintended consequences’ set to have a field-day? 
The overwhelming lesson from the history of revolutionary situations, from Paris 1789 to 
Cairo 2011, via Russia 1917, China 1911 and Iran 1979, is that unless strong and sound fresh 
governance structures are immediately put into place, the political dynamics lead to 
catastrophic radicalisation, chaos and conflict. This model of revolution is already on the 
move in Ukraine, but still at an early and reversible stage. To paraphrase George Santayana, 
European leaders from Brussels to Moscow must now ‘remember history before seeing it 
repeated’.   
 
 
